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THE “TIME OF ARREST” RULE: HOW THE 
WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT 
UNTETHERED ITS SEARCH INCIDENT TO ARREST 
JURISPRUDENCE FROM THE EXCEPTION’S 
UNDERLYING RATIONALES 
Laura Zanzig-Wong 
Abstract: The search incident to arrest exception is based on two exigencies: officer 
safety and evidence preservation. In searches incident to arrest of an arrestee’s person, these 
exigencies are presumed. Recently, the Washington State Supreme Court extended this 
presumption to all items carried by an arrestee at the time of arrest, regardless of whether the 
arrestee can access such items at the time of the search. I argue that this extension untethers 
the search incident to arrest doctrine from its underlying rationales and focuses too heavily 
on the practical issue of transporting an arrestee’s belongings to the station post-arrest. In 
doing so, the Court fails to uphold the Fourth Amendment and the more robust protection of 
individual rights offered by article I, section 7 of the Washington Constitution. Going 
forward, the Court should realign its search incident to arrest jurisprudence with the 
exception’s established justifications so that the constitutional rights of Washingtonians are 
properly protected. 
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BACKGROUND 
A. Search Incident to Arrest: Federal Law 
The Fourth Amendment establishes the “right of the 
people . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures.”1 Warrantless 
searches are “per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated 
exceptions.”2 These exceptions are justified by the “exigencies of the 
situation.”3 One warrant exception is the search incident to a lawful 
arrest.4 This exception “has always been considered to be a strictly 
limited right,” and, like all warrant exceptions, “grows out of the 
inherent necessities of the situation at the time of the arrest.”5 
As the United States Supreme Court explained in Chimel v. 
California,6 the search incident to arrest exception is justified by the 
potential for an arrestee to endanger an officer or destroy evidence: 
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer 
to search the person arrested in order to remove any weapons 
that the latter might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect 
his escape. Otherwise, the officer’s safety might well be 
endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In addition, it is 
entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and 
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent 
its concealment or destruction.7 
These concerns also justify a search of the area within the arrestee’s 
immediate control, meaning the area “from within which [an arrestee] 
might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”8 In Chimel, 
officers arrested the defendant in his home and searched the entire house 
                                                      
1. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
2. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). 
3. McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). 
4. See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
5. Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 708 (1948), overruled on other grounds by United 
States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950). 
6. 395 U.S. 752 (1969), abrogated on other grounds by Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 
(2011). 
7. Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–63. 
8. Id. at 763. 
Document1 (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2018  4:10 PM 
2018] THE “TIME OF ARREST” RULE 29 
 
on the basis of that arrest.9 The Court found that the rationales of officer 
safety and evidence preservation did not justify “routinely searching any 
room other than that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that 
matter, . . . searching through all the desk drawers or other closed or 
concealed areas in that room itself.”10 Thus, to the extent the officers 
searched beyond the area of the defendant’s immediate control, the 
search was unconstitutional.11 
Although searches incident to arrest are based upon the need to 
disarm and discover evidence, searches of an arrestee’s person are 
permissible regardless of the probability that weapons or evidence will 
in fact be found during a particular arrest.12 As set forth in United States 
v. Robinson,13 the legality of the arrest establishes the authority to 
search.14 This is because “the two risks identified in Chimel—harm to 
officers and destruction of evidence—are present in all custodial 
arrests.”15 In other words, Robinson established a categorical approach to 
reviewing searches of an arrestee’s person, which presumes the Chimel 
rationales exist during every arrest.16 Thus, if an arrest is lawful, a search 
of the arrestee’s person incident to that arrest requires no additional 
justification.17 Applying this categorical approach, the Robinson Court 
upheld the search of a cigarette package found in the arrestee’s pocket.18 
Robinson did not define the scope of an arrestee’s person and it is the 
only Supreme Court decision applying Chimel to a search of the contents 
of an item found on an arrestee’s person.19 Lower courts have treated 
small items on the arrestee’s person—namely, a wallet,20 a billfold,21 and 
a purse22—as part of his or her person for the purposes of the search 
incident to arrest. For example, in United States v. Watson,23 officers 
                                                      
9. Id. at 753–54.  
10. Id. at 763. 
11. Id.  
12. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 235 (1973). 
13. 414 U.S. 218.  
14. Id. at 235. 
15. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2484–85 (2014). 
16. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
17. Id.  
18. Id. at 218. 
19. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488. 
20. United States v. Watson, 669 F.2d 1374, 1383–84 (11th Cir. 1982). 
21. United States v. Carrion, 809 F.2d 1120, 1123, 1128 (5th Cir. 1987). 
22. United States v. Lee, 501 F.2d 890, 892 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
23. 669 F.2d 1374 (11th Cir. 1982). 
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searched the arrestee and removed his wallet.24 The defendant argued 
that the police needed a warrant to search the wallet because it was 
under their exclusive control—and thus inaccessible to the defendant.25 
Citing Robinson and Chimel, the court held that a warrant was 
unnecessary because the wallet was taken from the defendant’s person 
during a search incident to arrest.26 Likewise, in United States v. 
Carrion,27 the officers removed a billfold and an address book from the 
defendant’s pocket and searched them.28 The Fifth Circuit concluded 
that this was a valid search of his person.29 In United States v. Lee,30 at 
the “point of arrest,” an officer saw the defendant attempt to put drug 
paraphernalia in her purse.31 He searched the purse and found more 
paraphernalia inside.32 Without further analysis, the court concluded that 
the officer’s view of the paraphernalia in the arrestee’s hand “supplied 
probable cause for her arrest and the search of her purse incident 
thereto.”33 
However, Robinson’s categorical approach is not limitless; there must 
still be some threat to officer safety or evidence preservation. For 
example, in United States v. Chadwick,34 the Court held that 
“warrantless searches of luggage or other property seized at the time of 
an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the ‘search 
is remote in time or place from the arrest’ or no exigency exists.”35 In 
Chadwick, the defendants were arrested right after they lifted a 
footlocker into the trunk of their car.36 The footlocker was seized and, 
                                                      
24. Id. at 1383. 
25. Id. at 1383–84. 
26. Id. at 1384. 
27. 809 F.2d 1120 (5th Cir. 1987). 
28. Id. at 1123. 
29. Id. at 1128. 
30. 501 F.2d 890 (D.C. Cir. 1974). 
31. Id. at 891. 
32. Id.  
33. Id. at 892 (internal citations omitted). 
34. 433 U.S. 1 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 
(1991).  
35. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15 (internal citation omitted) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 
U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). Chadwick has been criticized for contributing to confusion about whether 
officers must have probable cause to conduct a warrantless search of a container in a car. See 
Acevedo, 500 U.S. at 568. This particular issue goes beyond the scope of this Article, so I do not 
further address that criticism. Rather, I cite to Chadwick for its discussion of items in the exclusive 
control of law enforcement officers and the resulting lack of exigency. 
36. Id. at 4. 
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for the next ninety minutes, remained under law enforcement’s exclusive 
control at all times.37 Officers then searched the footlocker without the 
arrestee’s consent and without a warrant.38 Citing Robinson, the 
Chadwick Court acknowledged that the “potential dangers lurking in all 
custodial arrests make warrantless searches of items within the 
‘immediate control’ area reasonable without requiring the arresting 
officer to calculate the probability that weapons or destructible evidence 
may be involved.”39 However, the Court continued: 
Once law enforcement officers have reduced luggage or other 
personal property not immediately associated with the person of 
the arrestee to their exclusive control, and there is no longer any 
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to 
seize a weapon or destroy evidence, a search of that property is 
no longer an incident of the arrest.40 
Similarly, in Arizona v. Gant,41 the United States Supreme Court 
made clear that police may search vehicles incident to arrest only if the 
arrestee can reach the passenger compartment at the time of the search or 
if it is reasonable to believe the vehicle contains evidence of the crime of 
arrest.42 This rule “ensure[s] that officers may search a vehicle when 
genuine safety or evidentiary concerns . . . justify a search.”43 Gant’s 
holding resolved a conflict in the lower courts over whether a vehicle 
could be searched incident to arrest even if the arrestee could not gain 
access to the vehicle at the time of the search.44 The Gant Court 
concluded that allowing such searches would “untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception.”45 Thus, in the context of 
vehicle searches incident to arrest, the Chimel rationales are not 
presumed. 
Recently, in Riley v. California,46 the United States Supreme Court 
declined to extend the categorical rule from Robinson to digital items, 
such as cell phones, found on an arrestee’s person.47 The Court reasoned 
                                                      
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 14–15. 
40. Id. at 15. 
41. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). 
42. Id. at 351. 
43. Id. at 347. 
44. Id. at 341. 
45. Id. at 343. 
46. 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014). 
47. Id. at 2485. 
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that Robinson struck the appropriate balance between governmental 
interests and individual privacy in the context of physical objects.48 
However, with respect to digital content, the Court found no comparable 
risk of officer harm or evidence destruction, as well as an enhanced 
privacy interest in the information contained in digital items.49 The Riley 
Court concluded that “officers must generally secure a warrant before 
conducting such a search.”50 Riley suggests that “a lawful arrest no 
longer provides categorical justification to search, without a warrant, all 
items found on an arrested person at the time of arrest.”51 However, the 
precise scope of the categorical approach remains unclear.52 
B. Search Incident to Arrest: Washington Law 
As the Washington State Supreme Court has frequently recognized, 
“[o]ur state constitution provides greater protection to individuals from 
warrantless searches and seizures than does the United States 
Constitution.”53 This greater protection comes from article I, section 7 of 
the Washington Constitution, which states: “[n]o person shall be 
disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of 
law.”54 While the Fourth Amendment precludes only “unreasonable” 
searches and seizures,55 article I, section 7 prohibits “any disturbance of 
an individual’s private affairs ‘without authority of law.’”56 Under 
Washington law, a warrantless search is “per se unreasonable and its 
fruits will be suppressed unless it falls within one of the carefully drawn 
                                                      
48. Id. at 2484. 
49. Id. at 2484–85; see also id. at 2489 (“A conclusion that inspecting the contents of an 
arrestee’s pockets works no substantial additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may 
make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of that reasoning to digital data has to 
rest on its own bottom.”). 
50. Id. at 2485. 
51. State v. VanNess, 186 Wash. App. 148, 160, 344 P.3d 713, 719 (2015). 
52. Cf. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488 (“Robinson is the only decision from this Court applying Chimel 
to a search of the contents of an item found on an arrestee’s person.”). 
53. State v. Ortega, 177 Wash. 2d 116, 122, 297 P.3d 57, 60 (2013); see also State v. Jackson, 
150 Wash. 2d 251, 259, 264, 76 P.3d 217, 222, 224 (2003) (GPS monitoring); State v. Boland, 115 
Wash. 2d 571, 575, 578, 800 P.2d 1112, 1114, 1116 (1990) (trash searches); City of Seattle v. 
Mesiani, 110 Wash. 2d 454, 456, 458, 755 P.2d 775, 776, 778 (1988) (DUI searches); State v. 
Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 64, 68, 720 P.2d 808, 813–14, 816 (1986) (phone records). 
54. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
55. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
56. State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751, 756 (2009) (quoting York v. 
Wahkiakum Sch. Dist., 163 Wash. 2d 297, 305–06, 178 P.3d 995, 1014 (2008)). 
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and jealously guarded exceptions to the warrant requirement.”57 “This 
creates ‘an almost absolute bar to warrantless arrests, searches, and 
seizures, with only limited exceptions.’”58 
The article I, section 7 inquiry has two parts: (1) whether the state 
action disturbs one’s private affairs and (2) whether the intrusion is 
justified by authority of law.59 “To determine the existence and scope of 
the jealously guarded exceptions that provide ‘authority of law’ absent a 
warrant, [courts] look at the constitutional text, the origins and law at the 
time our constitution was adopted, and the evolution of that law and its 
doctrinal development.”60 
The search incident to arrest exception under article I, section 7—like 
its sister exception under the Fourth Amendment—is grounded in the 
rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation.61 Because the 
exception is rooted in the lawful authority to take the arrestee into 
custody, it satisfies article I, section 7’s requirement that intrusions on a 
person’s privacy be lawful.62 Searches of an arrestee’s person thus 
require no additional justification beyond the lawfulness of the arrest.63 
C. The “Time of Arrest” Rule 
The Washington State Supreme Court has held that a search of an 
arrestee’s person includes “those personal articles in the arrestee’s actual 
and exclusive possession at or immediately preceding the time of 
arrest.”64 This so-called “time of arrest” rule does not extend to articles 
in an arrestee’s constructive possession,65 but only to those “immediately 
associated” with the arrestee “at or immediately preceding” his or her 
arrest.66 
In recent years, the Washington State Supreme Court has explored 
this issue multiple times.67 First, in State v. Byrd,68 the Court upheld the 
                                                      
57. Ortega, 177 Wash. 2d at 122, 297 P.3d at 60. 
58. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 772, 224 P.3d at 756 (quoting State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 
690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983)). 
59. York, 163 Wash. 2d at 306, 178 P.3d at 1001. 
60. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 773, 224 P.3d at 757. 
61. Id. 
62. State v. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d 611, 618, 310 P.3d 793, 796 (2013). 
63. Id. at 617–18, 310 P.3d at 796. 
64. Id. at 623, 310 P.3d at 799. 
65. Constructive possession is “[c]ontrol or dominion over a property without actual possession 
or custody of it.” Possession, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
66. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 623, 310 P.3d at 799.  
67. See, e.g., id.; State v. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 148, 355 P.3d 1118 (2015); State v. MacDicken, 
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search of a purse that was on the defendant’s lap at the time of arrest.69 
Before removing Byrd from the car, the officer took the purse and set it 
on the ground.70 He then secured Byrd in the patrol car and returned to 
the purse “moments” later to search it for weapons or contraband.71 He 
found methamphetamine inside.72 
The Washington State Supreme Court upheld the search.73 It cited to 
Robinson for the principle that “[u]nlike searches of the arrestee’s 
surroundings, searches of the arrestee’s person and personal effects do 
not require ‘a case-by-case adjudication’ because they always implicate 
Chimel concerns for officer safety and evidence preservation.”74 
Reasoning that the purse “left Byrd’s hands only after her arrest,” the 
Court concluded that “Byrd’s purse was unquestionably an article 
‘immediately associated’ with her person.”75 The Court further noted 
there was “no ‘significant delay between the arrest and the search’ that 
would ‘render the search unreasonable.’”76 Thus, if the officer had 
probable cause to arrest Byrd, he “had lawful authority to remove her 
and all articles closely associated with her person from the car, and the 
search was valid under the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7.”77 
The Court again addressed the time of arrest rule in State v. 
MacDicken.78 There, officers arrested the defendant in a parking lot 
while he was carrying a laptop bag and pushing a rolling duffel bag.79 
They ordered MacDicken to the ground, handcuffed him, and returned 
him to his feet.80 As he stood there, still handcuffed, an officer moved 
                                                      
179 Wash. 2d 936, 319 P.3d 31 (2014). 
68. 178 Wash. 2d 611, 310 P.3d 793 (2013). 
69. Id. at 615, 624, 310 P.3d at 795, 799. 
70. Id. at 615, 310 P.3d at 795. 
71. Id. 
72. Id. 
73. Id. at 614, 310 P.3d at 794. 
74. Id. at 618, 310 P.3d at 796 (quoting United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 253 (1973)). 
75. Id. at 623, 310 P.3d at 799.  
76. Id. at 624, 310 P.3d at 799 (quoting State v. Smith, 119 Wash. 2d 675, 682, 835 P.2d 1025, 
1029 (1992)). In Smith, the Court upheld the search of a fanny pack that fell from the defendant’s 
person when the officer arrested him. 119 Wash. 2d at 676–77, 835 P.2d at 1026. The officer placed 
the defendant in her patrol car where he could not reach the fanny pack. Id. at 677, 835 P.2d at 
1026. She then searched the fanny pack between nine and seventeen minutes later. Id. The Court 
found that neither the lapse in time nor the lack of access to the bag rendered the search 
unreasonable. See id. at 677–78, 835 P.2d at 1027.  
77. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 624, 310 P.3d at 799. 
78. 179 Wash. 2d 936, 319 P.3d 31 (2014). 
79. Id. at 939, 319 P.3d at 32. 
80. See id. 
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the bags a car’s length away and began to search them.81 Inside was 
evidence of a robbery that occurred the night before.82 
The Court rejected the notion that the car-length distance between 
MacDicken and the bags affected the search’s validity.83 Instead, the 
Court held that “the search of the bags carried by MacDicken at the time 
of his arrest constituted a search of his person” and thus did not analyze 
“whether the search was a valid search of the area within MacDicken’s 
immediate control under Chimel.”84 Because the bags were “in 
MacDicken’s actual and exclusive possession at the time of his arrest” 
and “there was no significant delay between the arrest and the search 
that would render the search unreasonable,” the Court found the search 
to be constitutional.85 
Most recently, in State v. Brock,86 the Court upheld the search of a 
backpack that was seized and separated from the defendant roughly ten 
minutes prior to arrest.87 The officer encountered Brock in a park that 
was closed to the public, giving the officer probable cause to arrest him 
for trespassing.88 The officer did not do so, instead separating Brock 
from his bag and performing a Terry89 stop and frisk of Brock’s 
person.90 The officer then secured the backpack in his vehicle twelve to 
fifteen feet away while continuing to question Brock.91 Upon 
determining that Brock had provided false information, the officer 
placed Brock under arrest.92 He left Brock standing twelve to fifteen feet 
away while he searched Brock’s bag for identification.93 Inside, the 
officer found what appeared to be marijuana and methamphetamine, 
along with Brock’s Department of Corrections inmate identification 
card.94 The officer handcuffed Brock and placed him in the back of his 
                                                      
81. Id. 
82. Id. at 938–39, 319 P.3d at 32. 
83. Id. at 941, 319 P.3d at 33. 
84. Id. 
85. Id. at 942, 319 P.3d at 34. 
86. 184 Wash. 2d 148, 355 P.3d 1118 (2015). 
87. Id. at 150–51, 355 P.3d at 1119. 
88. Id. at 151, 355 P.3d at 1119. 
89. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A “Terry stop” is an encounter in which police may “stop 
and briefly detain a person for investigative purposes.” United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 
(1989). 
90. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 151, 355 P.3d at 1119. 
91. Id. at 151–52, 355 P.3d at 1120. 
92. Id. at 152, 355 P.3d at 1120. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
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patrol truck.95 The officer then ran Brock’s real name through the 
database and discovered that Brock had a felony arrest warrant, meaning 
the officer “had no choice but to take Brock to jail.”96 Before doing so, 
the officer searched the remainder of Brock’s backpack for safety 
purposes97 and discovered evidence of identity theft and more potential 
narcotics.98 
The Court upheld the search, relying upon Byrd and Robinson in 
doing so.99 The Court reiterated the holding in Byrd that, where an item 
is part of an arrestee’s person, “the officer does not need to articulate any 
objective safety or evidence preservation concerns before . . . searching 
the item.”100 The Court also explained that “this ‘part of the person’ 
distinction” is justified by “presumptive safety and evidence 
preservation concerns associated with police taking custody of those 
personal items immediately associated with the arrestee, which will 
necessarily travel with the arrestee to jail.”101 The Court continued: 
[T]he safety and evidence preservation exigencies that justify 
this ‘time of arrest’ distinction stem from the safety concerns 
associated with the officer having to secure those articles of 
clothing, purses, backpacks, and even luggage, that will travel 
with the arrestee into custody. Because those items are part of 
the person, we recognize the practical reality that the officer 
seizes those items during the arrest. From that custodial 
authority flows the officer’s authority to search for weapons, 
contraband, and destructible evidence.102 
“Put simply,” the Court stated, “personal items that will go to jail with 
the arrestee are considered in the arrestee’s ‘possession’ and are within 
the scope of the officer’s authority to search.”103 
Applying this reasoning to the facts before it, the Court found that, 
although Brock had been separated from his bag for ten minutes before 
                                                      
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. “Officer Olson testified that he did not perform a thorough inventory at that time or catalogue 
the objects in the backpack. However, Officer Olson also testified that he would be unable to bring 
an arrestee’s personal effects to the jail without searching them for contraband, weapons, or 
explosives.” State v. Brock (Brock: Division One), 182 Wash. App. 680, 684, 330 P.3d 236, 238 
(2014), rev’d, Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 148, 355 P.3d 1118. 
98. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 152–53, 355 P.3d at 1120. 
99. Id. at 155, 355 P.3d at 1121. 
100. Id.  
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 156, 355 P.3d at 1122. 
103. Id. at 158, 355 P.3d at 1123. 
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he was arrested, “the passage of time prior to the arrest did not render it 
any less a part of Brock’s arrested person.”104 This was so, the Court 
explained, because Brock’s backpack was on his person when “the arrest 
process” had begun.105 Given that Brock “wore the backpack at the very 
moment he was stopped by Officer Olson” and “ha[d] no other place to 
safely stow it,” “the lapse of time had little practical effect on Brock’s 
relationship to his backpack.”106 In sum, the Court held that “when the 
officer removes the item from the arrestee’s person during a lawful 
Terry stop and the Terry stop ripens into a lawful arrest, the passage of 
time does not negate the authority of law justifying the search incident to 
arrest.”107 
ANALYSIS 
I argue that the Washington State Supreme Court’s decisions in Byrd, 
MacDicken, and Brock overextend Robinson’s categorical approach in 
contradiction to the Fourth Amendment, as well as article I, section 7’s 
even more jealous protection of warrant exceptions. These cases 
wrongly treat any item carried by an arrestee as part of the arrestee’s 
person, even if the arrestee cannot access the item when it is searched. 
Thus, the risks of officer harm and evidence preservation are not always 
present and should not be presumed. By so widely applying Robinson’s 
presumption, the Court disregarded the rationales underlying the search 
incident to arrest doctrine. Moreover, the Court based its ruling in part 
on the practical issue of transporting an arrestee’s personal items to the 
station, effectively treating this as a new rationale for the search incident 
to arrest exception. To curb this infringement on rights, the Court should 
realign its search incident to arrest jurisprudence with the exception’s 
underlying exigencies and with the heightened protection offered by 
article I, section 7.108 
A. The Washington State Supreme Court Failed to Jealously Guard the 
Search Incident to Arrest Exception as Article I, Section 7 Demands 
In upholding the searches in Byrd, MacDicken, and Brock, the 
                                                      




108. As will be discussed below, both the United States Supreme Court and the Washington State 
Supreme Court have made a similar realignment in the past. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 
341–44 (2008); State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 774–77, 224 P.3d 751, 757–60 (2009).  
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Washington State Supreme Court untethered the search incident to arrest 
doctrine from its underlying rationales. Robinson’s categorical approach 
is based on the inherent risk posed by the circumstances: unless the 
arrestee and the items on his or her person are searched, there always 
exists the risk of officer harm or evidence destruction during the arrest 
and subsequent transport.109 These exigencies do not dissipate unless the 
arrestee is searched and any evidence or weapons are secured.110 
However, such exigency was not present in Byrd, MacDicken, or 
Brock. In each of these cases, the arrestee was easily separated from the 
bag prior to the search, meaning the arrestee could not access it and thus 
no longer posed any threat of officer harm or evidence destruction in 
connection with the bag.111 Through these cases, the Court has expanded 
the scope of the “person of the arrestee”112 to include items within the 
“arrestee’s actual and exclusive possession”113 at the time of arrest, even 
if those items are in the exclusive possession of law enforcement—and 
thus inaccessible to the arrestee—at the time of the actual search.114 
More troublingly, in Brock, the Court contorted the rule to encompass an 
item in law enforcement’s exclusive possession for several minutes 
before the arrest even occurred.115 The Brock Court reasoned that “there 
was no significant delay between the arrest[s] and the search[es] that 
would render the search[es] unreasonable.”116 But once the defendant 
could no longer access his bag, any delay was significant because the 
                                                      
109. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973). 
110. Id. As noted above, for the same reason, officers may search—without articulating 
subjective concerns—the surrounding area where the arrestee could obtain a weapon or destroy 
evidence. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1977); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 
763 (1969). The Washington State Supreme Court did not treat the items in these cases as objects 
within the arrestee’s immediate control; instead, it categorically treated them as part of the arrestee’s 
person. See Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 155, 355 P.3d at 1121; State v. MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d 936, 
941, 319 P.3d 31, 33–34 (2014); State v. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d 611, 623, 310 P.3d 793, 799 (2013). 
Thus, this Article does not address that concept further. 
111. See Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 355 P.3d at 1119–20; MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d at 939, 
319 P.3d at 32; Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 615, 310 P.3d at 795.  
112. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224. 
113. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 623, 310 P.3d at 799. 
114. See id. at 615, 310 P.3d at 795; Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 355 P.3d at 1119–20; 
MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d at 939, 319 P.3d at 32. 
115. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 355 P.3d at 1119. 
116. MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d at 942, 319 P.3d at 34; see also Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 623–24, 
310 P.3d at 799 (“[T]here was no significant delay between the arrest[s] and the search[es] that 
would render the search[es] unreasonable.”); Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 159, 355 P.3d at 1123 (“Under 
these circumstances, the lapse of time had little practical effect on Brock’s relationship to his 
backpack.”). 
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underlying exigencies no longer existed.117 Under Washington law, the 
“justifications permitting a warrantless search incident to arrest are not 
simply products of judicial fancy, but of principled necessity.”118 
In criticizing this line of cases, I do not mean to suggest that no 
personal item could ever be searched incident to arrest. Robinson itself 
makes this clear: when the officer in that case “c[a]me upon the 
crumpled package of cigarettes, he was entitled to inspect it”—meaning 
open it and examine the contents within.119 However, I see an important 
distinction between items like a wallet or billfold in one’s pocket, as in 
Watson and Carrion, and items like the purse in Byrd,120 the rolling bag 
in MacDicken, and the backpack in Brock. Namely, the latter items are 
more easily separated from the arrestee without necessitating an 
immediate search. Indeed, the fact patterns in Byrd, MacDicken, and 
Brock reflect this practicality.121 By contrast, the presence and nature of 
items in one’s pockets are unknown to an officer until that area is 
searched. In that context, the categorical approach is warranted because 
the underlying exigencies are actually present until the search is 
concluded. One could view personal items on a continuum, with one end 
being the contents of a pocket, as in Robinson, and the other being a 
footlocker, as in Chadwick. The footlocker could not be searched once it 
was separated from the arrestee,122 while the cigarette wrapper could.123 
The bags in Byrd, MacDicken, and Brock fall somewhere in the middle: 
they are too big to fit in a pocket, but—with the exception of Brock—
were physically carried by the arrestees at the time of arrest. Still, these 
                                                      
117. Cf. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977) (“[W]arrantless searches of luggage or 
other property seized at the time of an arrest cannot be justified as incident to that arrest either if the 
‘search is remote in time or place from the arrest’ or no exigency exists.” (emphasis added) (internal 
citation omitted) (quoting Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964))), abrogated on other 
grounds by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991); United States v. Maddox, 614 F.3d 1046, 
1049 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Mere temporal or spatial proximity of the search to the arrest does not justify 
a search; some threat or exigency must be present to justify the delay.”). In Maddox, the court found 
unconstitutional a search of a keychain that was on the arrestee’s person at the time of arrest but not 
searched until the defendant was handcuffed and secured in the patrol car. 614 F.3d at 1048–49.  
118. State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 773, 224 P.3d 751, 757 (2009). 
119. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973). 
120. Like in Byrd, the Lee court treated the defendant’s purse as part of her person. United States 
v. Lee, 501 F.2d 890, 891–92 (D.C. Cir. 1974). However, the Lee opinion is of limited usefulness: it 
is lacking in details as to the nature of the purse, as well as analysis as to why the court treated the 
purse as part of the arrestee’s person. Moreover, I would argue that, for the reasons articulated in 
this Article, the Lee court reached the wrong conclusion on that issue. 
121. See Brock, 184 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 355 P.3d at 1119–20; MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d at 939, 
319 P.3d at 32; Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 615, 310 P.3d at 795. 
122. Chadwick, 433 U.S. at 15. 
123. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 236. 
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bags can be easily separated from an arrestee without necessitating an 
immediate search. For this reason, they should be treated like the 
footlocker, not the cigarette wrapper.124 Such treatment is particularly 
appropriate given the more extensive privacy protections of article I, 
section 7.125 
Instead, the Washington State Supreme Court categorically treated the 
bags as part of the arrestee’s person, without further reflection as to 
whether the same inherent justifications exist in that context.126 The 
Court cites Robinson as support for its broad statement that officers may 
search “an arrestee’s person and personal effects” pursuant to a lawful 
arrest.127 But, Robinson refers only to the “person of the arrestee.”128 
Again, while certain personal effects fall within Robinson’s purview, to 
apply its categorical approach to all personal items—even those 
inaccessible to the arrestee—is a substantial leap. As Justice Sheryl 
Gordon McCloud states in her dissent in MacDicken, a “court cannot 
avoid th[e] question [of access] just by labeling the items searched—in 
this case a shoulder bag and a piece of rolling luggage—’projection[s] of 
[the arrestee’s] person.’”129 
The question of access is crucial here: in each case, the bag was 
secured away from the arrestee at the time of the search.130 Under these 
circumstances, the bags cannot pose the inherent risks identified in 
Robinson. Instead, as Chadwick makes clear, “there [wa]s no longer any 
danger that the arrestee might gain access to the property to seize a 
weapon or destroy evidence”—meaning “a search of that property [wa]s 
no longer an incident of the arrest.”131 Where the justifications for a 
warrantless search are so quickly eliminated, a warrant should be 
required.132 The Washington State Supreme Court held to the contrary, 
                                                      
124. By making this comparison, I do not necessarily intend to draw a bright line; these 
distinctions are not crystal clear and each case will likely be fact-specific. Rather, what I 
recommend is an approach to personal items that relies more heavily on Chimel and applies 
Robinson more narrowly, so that these distinctions can be teased out and the rule remains tethered to 
the rationales.   
125. See State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 772, 224 P.3d 751, 757 (2009). 
126. See Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 617–18, 310 P.3d at 796. 
127. Id. at 618, 310 P.3d at 796 (emphasis added). 
128. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 224. 
129. State v. MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d 936, 946, 319 P.3d 31, 36 (2014) (Gordon McCloud, J., 
dissenting) (quoting MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d at 941, 319 P.3d at 34 (majority opinion)). 
130. See State v. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 148, 151–52, 355 P.3d 1118, 1119–20 (2015); MacDicken, 
179 Wash. 2d at 939, 319 P.3d at 32; Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 615, 310 P.3d at 795. 
131. United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 15 (1977), abrogated on other grounds by California 
v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991). 
132. See State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009) (“[W]hen an arrest is 
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effectively untethering the search incident to arrest exception from the 
rationales of officer safety and evidence preservation. 
B. The Washington State Supreme Court Effectively Extended the 
Rationales Underlying the Search Incident to Arrest Exception to 
Include Post-Arrest Transport of an Arrestee’s Belongings 
Instead of applying the established rationales for warrantless searches 
incident to arrest, the Court focused on the issue of transporting an 
arrestee’s personal items to the station post-arrest—an inappropriate 
consideration in this context.133 “It is not the place of the judiciary . . . to 
weigh constitutional liberties against arguments of public interest or 
state expediency.”134 Nonetheless, the Court relied on the issue of item 
transport in upholding the searches in Byrd, MacDicken, and Brock—
effectively creating a third rationale for the search incident to arrest 
exception. 
For example, in Byrd, the Court reasoned that: 
The time of arrest rule reflects the practical reality that a search 
of the arrestee’s “person” to remove weapons and secure 
evidence must include more than his literal person . . . . When 
police take an arrestee into custody, they also take possession of 
his clothing and personal effects, any of which could contain 
weapons and evidence.135 
This principle was relied upon in MacDicken136 and, in Brock, extended 
to an item that was not actually on the defendant’s person at the time of 
arrest.137 Specifically, the Court reasoned that the “officer himself 
removed the backpack from Brock as a part of his investigation. And, 
having no other place to safely stow it, Brock would have to bring the 
                                                      
made, the normal course of securing a warrant to conduct a search is not possible if that search must 
be immediately conducted for the safety of the officer or to prevent concealment or destruction of 
evidence of the crime of arrest. However, when a search can be delayed to obtain a warrant without 
running afoul of those concerns (and does not fall under another applicable exception), the warrant 
must be obtained.”). 
133. Cf. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 776, 224 P.3d at 758 (“The Stroud court balanced privacy 
interests guaranteed under article I, section 7 with concerns for law enforcement ease and 
expediency . . . It is not the place of the judiciary, however, to weigh constitutional liberties against 
arguments of public interest or state expediency.”). 
134. Id. 
135. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 621, 310 P.3d at 798. 
136. See State v. MacDicken, 179 Wash. 2d 936, 941–42, 319 P.3d 31, 33–34 (2014). 
137. 184 Wash. 2d 148, 158, 355 P.3d 1118, 1123 (2015) (“[T]he search incident to arrest rule 
recognizes the practicalities of an officer having to secure and transport personal items as part of the 
arrestee’s person . . . .”). 
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backpack along with him into custody.”138 Thus, because the backpack 
was on Brock’s person when “the arrest process had begun”—although 
the likelihood of arrest was still uncertain—the Court found that the 
search incident to arrest exception applied categorically.139 
I recognize the practical reality of transporting items and the fact that 
the transport of items can pose a risk to officer safety and evidence 
preservation. Indeed, Robinson explicitly acknowledges this 
possibility.140 However, the weight given to that consideration in Byrd, 
MacDicken, and Brock—where officer safety and evidence preservation 
were not actually at issue—elevates the issue of item transport above 
constitutional rights. 
There are available alternatives that address this practical concern 
without distorting the search incident to arrest doctrine and 
compromising constitutional rights. First, the officer could get a search 
warrant.141 As the Washington State Supreme Court itself has said: 
Article I, section 7 is a jealous protector of privacy. As 
recognized at common law, when an arrest is made, the normal 
course of securing a warrant to conduct a search is not possible 
if that search must be immediately conducted for the safety of 
the officer or to prevent concealment or destruction of evidence 
of the crime of arrest. However, when a search can be delayed to 
obtain a warrant without running afoul of those concerns . . . , 
the warrant must be obtained.142 
In the cases discussed here, though, the searches were not conducted 
immediately, nor was there any exigency making an immediate search 
necessary. To permit a warrantless search in these circumstances runs 
contrary to the Court’s statement that article I, section 7 creates “an 
almost absolute bar” to warrantless searches.143 This is not to say that an 
                                                      
138. Id. at 159, 355 P.3d at 1123. 
139. Id. 
140. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 234–35 (1973). 
141. It may be helpful here to note the distinction between an arrest warrant and a search warrant. 
While both subject an officer’s probable cause determination to judicial review, they protect 
different interests. Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 212–13 (1981). An arrest warrant is 
obtained upon a showing of probable cause to believe that an individual committed an offense; it 
thus protects that person from an unreasonable seizure. Id. at 213. A search warrant is obtained upon 
a showing of probable cause to believe that the object of the search is in a particular place; it thus 
protects an individual from an unreasonable invasion into the privacy of his or her home and 
possessions. Id. An arrest warrant does not establish the lawful authority for a search. See id. at 
215–16.  
142. State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009). 
143. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243 (1983), overruled in part on 
other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). 
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officer cannot separate a bag from a defendant, as the officer did in 
Brock.144 But once that separation occurs, there is no justification for a 
warrantless search. 
Second, if the item must be transported to the station without 
obtaining a warrant, the officer could conduct an inventory search. In 
inventory searches, police have discretion to search items brought with 
an arrestee to jail “so long as that discretion is exercised according to 
standard criteria and on the basis of something other than suspicion 
of . . . criminal activity.”145 Inventory searches are thus “not 
investigatory in scope and are not intended to be searches for 
evidence.”146 Their purpose is to “protect the [] owner’s property while it 
is in police custody and control, protect the police from dishonest claims 
of theft, and protect officers and the community from potentially 
dangerous situations.”147 The inventory search exception gives police 
rather broad power to search personal items. Still, a constitutional 
inventory search is limited in scope; even if the search follows standard 
police procedure, its direction and extent must be restricted to the 
underlying rationales.148 Practically speaking, an inventory search could 
be less invasive than a search incident to arrest. For example, the law 
enforcement agency’s practice could be to simply list “locked box” or 
“backpack,” without opening such containers. More importantly, 
because warrant exceptions derive their validity from their underlying 
exigencies, it is important not to blur the line between two exceptions.149 
Otherwise, the Court risks creating a hybrid exception that is no longer 
justified by either exception’s rationales. If the police must transport an 
arrestee’s belongings to the station, the inventory search exception 
                                                      
144. Cf. Brock: Division One, 182 Wash. App. 680, 691, 330 P.3d 236, 241 (2014) (Becker, J., 
dissenting) (“The officer was entitled to put the backpack out of reach for his own safety while he 
decided whether or not to make an arrest.”), rev’d, State v. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 148, 355 P.3d 1118 
(2015). 
145. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). 
146. Nicholas B. Stampfli, After Thirty Years, Is It Time to Change the Vehicle Inventory Search 
Doctrine?, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1031, 1032 (2007). As the author points out, inventory searches 
are not without their own set of problems. However, that issue is beyond the scope of this Article. 
147. Id. at 1033. 
148. State v. Houser, 95 Wash. 2d 143, 154, 622 P.2d 1218, 1225 (1980) (“Not every inventory 
taken in compliance with police department regulations is lawful and where a search is improper it 
cannot be legitimatized by conducting it pursuant to standard police procedure.”). 
149. See State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 773, 224 P.3d 751, 757 (2009) (“These justifications 
permitting a warrantless search incident to arrest are not simply products of judicial fancy, but of 
principled necessity.”); cf. State v. Winterstein, 167 Wash. 2d 620, 636, 220 P.3d 1226, 1233 (2009) 
(rejecting the inevitable discovery doctrine “because it is incompatible with the nearly categorical 
exclusionary rule under article I, section 7”). 
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adequately addresses that concern. The Court need not encroach on the 
bounds of the search incident to arrest exception. 
Third, if feasible, the officer could give the bag to someone 
accompanying the arrestee or ask the arrestee if someone is available to 
come pick up the bag. This is an option in the context of vehicle 
impoundment in Washington State,150 and it could work with personal 
items as well. When determining whether to impound a vehicle, an 
officer must at least consider alternatives to impoundment, and the 
reasonableness of impoundment depends on the particular facts of the 
case.151 Where the particular facts of an arrest allow, this would be a 
reasonable alternative to bringing an item along to the jail. 
In sum, the Court placed too much emphasis on the issue of 
transporting items in concluding that the searches were valid. This is an 
inappropriate consideration in this context.152 And, as the alternatives 
above demonstrate, officer safety and evidence preservation can be 
addressed without granting blanket authority to search personal items 
without a warrant. It may be the most convenient option for officers. 
But, as Washington law makes clear, the “search incident to arrest 
exception, born of the common law, arises from the necessity to provide 
for officer safety and the preservation of evidence of the crime of arrest, 
and the application and scope of that exception must be so grounded and 
so limited.”153 
The balance between police safety and defendants’ rights is 
particularly controversial in this day and age.154 Because of this sensitive 
                                                      
150. See, e.g., State v. Coss, 87 Wash. App. 891, 900, 943 P.2d 1126, 1130 (1997) (impoundment 
unreasonable because officer did not inquire whether defendant’s passengers could drive car after 
her arrest); State v. Hardman, 17 Wash. App. 910, 914, 567 P.2d 238, 241 (1977) (impoundment 
unreasonable because officer knew that defendant’s family lived nearby but did not inquire whether 
someone was available to come pick up the car). 
151. Coss, 87 Wash. App. at 899–900, 943 P.2d at 1129–30. 
152. See Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 773, 776, 224 P.3d at 757–59; State v. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 
148, 161, 355 P.3d 1118, 1124 (2015) (Gordon McCloud, J., dissenting) (reasoning that “[t]he 
majority’s second argument—that an object always poses a danger when it must be transported to 
the jail—stems from a misreading of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. 
Edwards . . . . Edwards contradicts rather than supports the assertion that it is inherently dangerous 
to transport items before they are searched” (citation omitted)).  
153. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 776, 224 P.3d at 758–59. 
154. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Justice Department Releases Investigative 
Findings on the Seattle Police Department (Dec. 16, 2011), https://www.justice.gov/opa 
/pr/justice-department-releases-investigative-findings-seattle-police-department [https://perma.cc 
/YL2C-7FP7] (finding that the Seattle Police Department “has engaged in a pattern or practice of 
excessive force that violates the Constitution and federal law”); Kim Bellware, Blue Lives Matter, 
Black Lives Matter Clash After Man Fatally Shot by Chicago Police, HUFFPOST (Nov. 7, 2016, 3:44 
PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/mt-greenwood-protest_us_5820990ee4b0d9ce6fbd4117; 
 
Document1 (Do Not Delete) 5/10/2018  4:10 PM 
2018] THE “TIME OF ARREST” RULE 45 
 
time, criminal procedure is inarguably a delicate area of law. The Court 
is tasked with balancing the interests of police safety and intrusions into 
privacy, and I do not wish to diminish the seriousness of that task.155  In 
this context, though, the issue was not truly police safety—more 
accurately, it was a matter of police convenience. In such circumstances, 
it is particularly important to carefully consider any intrusions on 
constitutional rights. If the Court fails to do so, those rights cease to be 
“jealously guarded.”156 
C. The Washington State Supreme Court Should Realign Its Search 
Incident to Arrest Jurisprudence with the Exception’s Underlying 
Rationales and the Protections Afforded by the Fourth Amendment 
and Article I, Section 7 
The Washington State Supreme Court should realign its search 
incident to arrest jurisprudence with the exigencies justifying the 
exception. Especially given that article I, section 7 affords even greater 
privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment,157 the “time of arrest” 
rule as it stands today is problematic. To remedy this departure from the 
exception’s underlying rationales, the Court should more narrowly 
construe the concept of an arrestee’s person. This includes refining the 
definition of the “time of arrest” rule so Robinson’s categorical approach 
does not widely apply to all personal items in an arrestee’s possession at 
the time of arrest. In the context of personal items that are easily 
separated from the arrestee—as opposed to, for example, items found in 
the arrestee’s pockets—the Court should ask “whether application of the 
search incident to arrest doctrine to this particular category of effects 
would ‘untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel 
                                                      
Mike Carter, Jail Time for Ex-Tukwila Cop Who Pepper-Sprayed Handcuffed Man in Hospital, 
SEATTLE TIMES (Mar. 21, 2017, 9:49 AM), http://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/crime/ex-
tukwila-cop-sentenced-to-9-months-for-pepper-spraying-handcuffed-man-in-hospital/. 
155. I would further like to recognize the professionalism exhibited by the officer in Brock, 
whose clear intent was to avoid an arrest if possible. Judge Mary Kay Becker addressed this 
professionalism in her dissent to Brock: Division One and expressed concern that to “hold that the 
search became invalid because the officer decided to investigate before making an arrest would 
create an undesirable incentive for hasty arrests.” 182 Wash. App. 680, 691, 330 P.3d 236, 241 
(2014) (Becker, J., dissenting), rev’d, Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 148, 355 P.3d 1118. While this 
unfortunate result is possible, I submit that it would be less likely to negatively impact defendants 
than the expansion of the search incident to arrest rule adopted by the Washington State Supreme 
Court. 
156. See State v. Ortega, 177 Wash. 2d 116, 122, 297 P.3d 57, 60 (2013). 
157. Id. 
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exception.’”158 This would not render all personal items immune from 
search; rather, it would ensure that Robinson’s categorical approach is 
applied sparsely and that searches are performed pursuant to a warrant or 
are otherwise justified by the particular circumstances. Much like the 
United States Supreme Court did in Gant, the Washington State 
Supreme Court would curb the expansion of the search incident to arrest 
doctrine beyond its rationales.159 
In fact, the Washington State Supreme Court recently did this in the 
vehicle search incident to arrest context.160 In State v. Valdez,161 the 
Court noted that “the search incident to arrest exception has been 
stretched beyond [its] underlying justifications, permitting searches 
beyond what was necessary for officer safety and preservation of the 
evidence of the crime of arrest.”162 Valdez overruled a previous 
Washington State Supreme Court decision, State v. Stroud,163 which held 
that, “[d]uring the arrest process, including the time immediately 
subsequent to the suspect’s being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a 
patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible evidence.”164 The 
Valdez Court clarified that: 
[A]fter an arrestee is secured and removed from the automobile, 
he or she poses no risk of obtaining a weapon or concealing or 
destroying evidence of the crime of arrest located in the 
automobile, and thus the arrestee’s presence does not justify a 
warrantless search under the search incident to arrest 
exception.165 
The Court limited the exception to circumstances “when that search is 
                                                      
158. Riley v. California, 573 U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 
U.S. 332, 343 (2009)). 
159. In Gant, the U.S. Supreme Court did not technically overturn a previous case; rather, it 
clarified how a previous case, New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), should be read. See Gant, 
556 U.S. at 341–44. Thus, the Gant Court did not have to address the issue of stare decisis. While 
that would be something the Washington State Supreme Court would have to confront, given the 
considerations raised in this Article, the current jurisprudence is “incorrect and harmful.” See In re 
Stranger Creek & Tributaries in Stevens Cty., 77 Wash. 2d 649, 653, 466 P.2d 508, 511 (1970).  
160. See State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 774–77, 224 P.3d 751, 757–60 (2009). While it is 
beyond the scope of this Article, there is another interesting issue at play in this area of law: the 
privacy interest in one’s personal items, such as purses or backpacks, as compared to the privacy 
interest in one’s vehicle. 
161. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). 
162. Id. at 774, 224 P.3d at 757. 
163. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986). 
164. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441. 
165. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759. 
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necessary to preserve officer safety or prevent destruction or 
concealment of evidence of the crime of arrest.”166 Although the 
circumstances of a vehicle search are not identical to the search of 
personal items like backpacks, both involve belongings that can easily 
be separated from the arrestee, thus nullifying the underlying rationales 
before the search is even conducted. Given this similarity, the Court 
should take the same exigency-focused approach in the personal item 
context as it did in Valdez. 
The Washington Court of Appeals did so in a recent search incident to 
arrest case.167 In State v. VanNess,168 the court held that the search of a 
locked box found in a backpack on the defendant’s person was not a 
valid search incident to arrest.169 The court reasoned that, “[a]fter Riley, 
a lawful arrest no longer provides categorical justification to search, 
without a warrant, all items found on an arrested person at the time of 
arrest.”170 Accordingly, the court applied the Chimel test and considered 
whether the underlying justifications were present.171 Because VanNess 
was handcuffed, his backpack was on the opposite side of the patrol car, 
and the box was still locked, he “no longer had access to the contents of 
his backpack” and could not have harmed an officer or destroyed any 
evidence.172 Under those circumstances, the officer could not perform a 
warrantless search.173 Although the items in Byrd, MacDicken, and 
Brock were unlocked, the reasoning still applies: simply because 
something is on an arrestee’s person at the time of arrest does not mean 
it inherently threatens officer safety or evidence preservation. 
Cases like Brock demonstrate “the danger of wandering from the 
narrow principled justifications of the [search incident to arrest] 
exception.”174 If those justifications are disregarded, the exception 
becomes untethered from its rationales—or, as discussed above, new 
rationales are created. Justice Gordon McCloud raised a similar concern 
                                                      
166. Id. Consistent with article I, section 7’s heightened protections, Valdez goes a step further 
than Gant, which allows a search of the vehicle if it is reasonable to believe that evidence of the 
crime of the arrest is inside, even if the arrestee cannot reach the passenger compartment. Arizona v. 
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009). 
167. There was no petition for review in this case; thus, the Washington State Supreme Court did 
not consider this particular issue.  
168. 186 Wash. App. 148, 344 P.3d 713 (2015). 
169. Id. at 164, 344 P.3d at 722. 
170. Id. at 160, 344 P.3d at 719. 
171. Id. at 160–61, 344 P.3d at 720. 
172. Id. at 161, 344 P.3d at 720. 
173. Id. at 162, 344 P.3d at 720. 
174. State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 774–75, 224 P.3d 751, 758 (2009). 
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in her Brock dissent.175 She argued that, by interpreting “the time of 
arrest” to include “the time of a Terry stop that ripens into an arrest,” the 
majority effectively created “a new exception to the warrant 
requirement: the search incident to a Terry stop.”176 Justice Gordon 
McCloud further expressed “fear [that] the majority’s new rule will only 
invite further expansions of our ‘narrow’ and ‘jealously guarded’ 
exception to the warrant requirement.”177 Given the trend in this line of 
cases, I share that fear. 
CONCLUSION 
Byrd, MacDicken, and Brock constitute an increasingly expansive 
application of Robinson that is incompatible with the Fourth 
Amendment and the “jealously guarded”178 warrant exceptions under 
article I, section 7. Rather than carefully considering whether these 
warrantless searches were justified by their underlying exigencies, the 
Court broadly applied Robinson to encompass any item carried by an 
arrestee, regardless of whether the arrestee can access the item when it is 
searched. Moreover, the Court focused on the practical issue of 
transporting an arrestee’s belongings, elevating that consideration above 
individual privacy rights. Going forward, the Court should refocus its 
search incident to arrest jurisprudence on the exception’s established 
rationales, thus ensuring that the constitutional rights of Washington 
citizens receive the protection that the Fourth Amendment and article I, 
section 7 promise. 
 
                                                      
175. See State v. Brock, 184 Wash. 2d 148, 167–68, 355 P.3d 1118, 1127–28 (2015) (Gordon 
McCloud, J., dissenting). 
176. Id. at 168, 355 P.3d at 1128 (quoting State v. Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d 611, 623, 310 P.3d 793, 
799 (2013)). 
177. Id. (quoting Byrd, 178 Wash. 2d at 623, 310 P.3d at 799). 
178. State v. Ortega, 177 Wash. 2d 116, 122, 297 P.3d 57, 60 (2013). 
